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DOES EARNINGS QUALITY AFFECT INFORMATION ASYMMETRY? 
EVIDENCE FROM TRADING COSTS 
 
Nilabhra Bhattacharya, Hemang Desai and Kumar Venkataraman  
 
ABSTRACT 
Information asymmetry in financial markets relates to the idea that one party to a transaction has 
better information than the other. Since financial reporting involves the transmission of value-
relevant enterprise information, we investigate whether the quality of reported earnings can 
contribute to differentially informed financial market participants. Higher information 
asymmetry is costly as it increases the adverse selection risk for market participants and lowers 
liquidity. For a large sample of NYSE and NASDAQ firms, we show that (i) poor earnings 
quality is significantly and incrementally associated with higher information asymmetry, (ii) 
earnings quality disproportionately affects information asymmetry for firms with poor 
information environments, (iii) both innate and discretionary components of earnings quality 
increase information asymmetry, and (iv) poor earnings quality exacerbates the information 
asymmetry around earnings announcements. Our results suggest that the standard setters’ efforts 
to develop accounting standards that improve earnings quality should contribute to a better 
information environment for market participants and increase stock liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental role of accounting information in financial markets is to serve as a basis 
for capital allocation. An important attribute of the quality of accounting information is the 
extent to which earnings (accruals) map into cash flows. A poor mapping of accruals into cash 
flows reduces the information content of reported earnings and results in lower quality earnings. 
If investors differ in their ability to process earnings related information, then poor earnings 
quality can result in differentially informed investors and thereby exacerbate the information 
asymmetry in financial markets (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Kim and Verrecchia 1994). 
Analytical models (e.g., Kyle 1985; Glosten and Milgrom 1985) predict that differential 
information among market participants increase the adverse selection risk for liquidity providers. 
In response, liquidity providers demand a larger compensation and widen the spread between the 
bid and the ask prices, thereby lowering liquidity and increasing the cost of capital.1  
Consequently, the determinants and consequences of earnings quality are of interest to 
investors, managers, regulators and standard setters. The linkages discussed above are best 
summarized by the words of Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), “an important benefit of high quality accounting standards is improved 
liquidity and lower cost of capital.”2 A notion implicit in this remark is that regulators and 
standard setters view the reduction in information asymmetry to be an important benefit of 
improved earnings quality. In this study, we examine whether poor earnings quality is associated 
with higher information asymmetry in capital markets.   
                                                 
1The linkage between liquidity and the cost of capital is well established. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), among others, document the cross-sectional association between liquidity costs 
and expected returns. Using an event study methodology, Amihud et al. (1997) and Venkataraman and Waisburd 
(2007) show that the improvements in market structure (i.e., improvements in liquidity) are associated with positive 
abnormal returns around the event.  
2The remarks are excerpted from the speech given by Arthur Levitt to Inter-American Development Bank on 
September 29, 1997. 
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Using an accruals based measure of earnings quality (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper 2005, FLOS hereafter) and a market microstructure based measure of information 
asymmetry (the price impact of trade), we test for the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry for a large sample of NYSE and NASDAQ firms over the period 1998 to 
2007. We find that poor earnings quality is significantly and incrementally (i.e., over and above a 
well-established benchmark model of trading costs) associated with higher information 
asymmetry. We further investigate whether the negative effects on information asymmetry are 
more pronounced for certain types of firms than others. We find that poor earnings quality has a 
more pronounced impact on firms operating in poor information environment, such as small 
firms and those with low institutional ownership and low analyst following. Specifically, the 
magnitude of the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry is estimated 
to be more than twice as large for small firms as compared to large firms. 
The extent to which a firm’s earnings (accruals) map into cash flows is affected by its 
operating environment and the business model (innate factors) as well as by discretionary 
reporting choices made by the managers (discretionary factors).  To assess the relative 
contribution of each of the above factors to information asymmetry, we decompose the earnings 
(accruals) quality measure into an innate component and a discretionary component following 
the approach in FLOS (2005).  We find that the innate component has a significant incremental 
impact on information asymmetry, suggesting that informed investors have a greater advantage 
in firms that are operating in uncertain and volatile environment. Furthermore, both extreme 
positive and extreme negative discretionary accruals increase information asymmetry. The latter 
result suggests that discretionary choices made by managers that cause accruals to map “too 
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well” into cash flows relative to other firms in the same industry can befuddle investors and 
contribute to information asymmetry.   
In order to account for omitted firm characteristics that may simultaneously affect 
information asymmetry and earnings quality, we employ a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. We continue to find a significant association between the earnings quality instrument 
and information asymmetry in the IV regressions. We also implement an event study approach to 
examine whether poor earnings quality exacerbates information asymmetry around earnings 
releases (see Lee, Mucklow, and Ready 1993). The event study design helps address possible 
endogeneity concerns because each firm serves as its own control and hence mitigates the 
concern that the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry is due to 
omitted firm characteristics.  Our results suggest that poor earnings quality is associated not only 
with information asymmetry during non-event periods but also with the increase in information 
asymmetry around earnings releases.    
Our study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. Prior studies examining 
the association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry are based on small 
samples because the disclosure measure is either self-constructed (Botosan 1997) or based on 
AIMR disclosure scores (Welker 1995; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Heflin, Shaw, and Wild 
2005, among others). Since AIMR scores are available only for large firms with significant 
analyst following, it is unclear how a firm’s information environment affects the relation 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry. Moreover, AIMR scores are not available 
after 1996.  The last two decades have witnessed the enactment of several major regulations 
including Regulation Fair Disclosure, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 and the Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act. These regulations have been enacted with the intended effect of improving earnings 
quality and leveling the informational playing field for market participants.   
However, recent research (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 2001) finds that 
idiosyncratic volatility has increased in recent years. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) show 
that reduced earnings quality is associated with increased firm-level volatility.  Furthermore, 
Fama and French (2004), and Klein and Mohanram (2006) document an increased incidence of 
younger and less-profitable firms going public in recent years.  These developments are likely to 
adversely affect the earnings quality of public firms and increase the information advantage of 
sophisticated investors thereby exacerbating information asymmetry. Consequently, it is 
important to understand the extent to which earnings quality influences information asymmetry 
in recent time periods.  Our study, based on a larger and more representative sample over a 
recent period, is timely and relevant for regulators and market participants. 
Moreover, there is significant controversy in the literature regarding the underlying 
mechanism through which earnings quality affects cost of capital.  FLOS (2005) argue that 
accruals quality is an important source of non-diversifiable “information risk” (Easely and 
O’Hara 2004).  However, Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008) show that the pricing effect of 
accruals/earnings quality documented in FLOS (2005) is not robust.  Our study contributes to 
this debate by examining whether earnings quality affects the cost of capital via its impact on 
trading costs.  As discussed earlier, this linkage relies on the well documented relation from the 
market microstructure literature that (a) information asymmetry increases liquidity cost (Glosten 
and Milgrom 1985) and (b) liquidity is priced as investors maximize expected returns, net of 
liquidity costs (Amihud and Mendelson 1986, among others).  Thus, notwithstanding the debate 
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on whether information risk is diversifiable, our evidence suggests that poor earnings quality 
increases the cost of capital via its impact on market liquidity.   
Our study also provides empirical support for predictions from recent theoretical work.  
Lambert and Verrecchia (2011) argue that the adverse consequences of information asymmetry 
are inversely related to the degree of investor competition in a stock. We find that the association 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry is more pronounced for small firms and 
firms with low institutional ownership. Such firms are likely to be characterized by imperfect 
competition among investors in that the sophisticated investors are likely to have a greater 
informational advantage over liquidity motivated traders. Our results provide indirect empirical 
support for these theoretical predictions and identify certain types of firms (e.g, small firms) and 
information events (e.g., earnings announcements) where earnings quality has a disproportionate 
adverse effect on information asymmetry.  These findings are important because the value of 
liquidity provision is much greater for smaller firms and during periods surrounding the release 
of fundamental information due to the elevated level of uncertainty (see Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and 
Titman (2011) for recent evidence).   
We note that the information asymmetry proxy used by the study, the price impact of 
trade, is a direct measure of the adverse selection risk faced by liquidity providers as reflected in 
trading costs. Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) provide theoretical support for this 
measure based on the adverse information conveyed by a trade, while Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) document that adverse information, as measured by the price impact of 
trade, affects asset prices. The price impact measure is also widely used in the empirical market 
microstructure literature (see Huang and Stoll 1996; Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997) as well 
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as by regulators.3  This measure more reliably reflects adverse selection risk than other 
commonly used proxies such as bid-ask spreads and the Probability of Information-based 
Trading (PIN), developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002).4  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background 
literature and develops the study’s testable hypothesis. Section 3 describes the empirical proxies 
of earnings quality and information asymmetry, and also presents the study’s research design. 
Section 4 describes our data and our sample. The empirical results are reported in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks.   
 
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Literature on disclosure quality and information asymmetry  
Theoretical models (e.g., Diamond 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) predict that higher 
quality disclosures lower information asymmetry between market participants, and as a result, 
reduce the cost of capital.  Welker (1995) is the first empirical study to document an inverse 
association between disclosure quality and bid-ask spreads. Heflin et al. (2005) also find that 
higher quality disclosures are associated with greater liquidity using AIMR scores as a proxy for 
disclosure and trading costs as a proxy for information asymmetry. In a recent study, Brown and 
Hillegeist (2007) find an association between disclosure quality (based on AIMR scores) and the 
probability of informed trade (PIN) measure.  
                                                 
3 From September 2001, the SEC has required each U.S. stock “market center” to compile and disseminate, on a 
monthly basis, various standardized measures of execution quality to provide traders with information on the 
execution quality of their trades (SEC Rule 605, formerly 11Ac1-5). These measures include the effective spread 
and the price impact of trade metrics (Boehmer 2005). 
4 Evidence in recent studies (Duarte and Young, 2009; Mohanram and Rajgopal, 2009) raises doubts regarding the 
ability of the PIN measure to capture information risk that is priced by investors. A limitation of bid-ask spreads as a 
proxy for information asymmetry is that it captures both information and non-information (e.g., inventory risk) 
components of liquidity provision. 
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Healy et al. (1999) and Leuz and Verrechia (2000) adopt a time series approach to 
examine the association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry. Healy et al. 
(1999) examine firms with sustained improvements in disclosure quality (using AIMR scores) 
and document capital market benefits such as improved stock performance, improved liquidity 
and greater analyst following.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document that the improved 
disclosure standards for a sample of German firms that switch from German GAAP to either U.S 
GAAP or International Accounting Standards (IAS) are associated with lower bid-ask spreads.5   
In summary, extant research indicates that a firm’s overall disclosure quality is associated 
with information asymmetry.  However, it is difficult to reliably infer the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry from research that primarily examines a firm’s 
overall disclosure quality. A firm’s overall disclosure quality is a nebulous construct because a 
firm has numerous financial and non-financial attributes and extant proxies of disclosure quality 
aggregate these attributes in an ad hoc fashion since there is no theoretical guidance on how to 
compute a composite metric. Neither theoretical models nor empirical studies establish that 
firms’ overall disclosure quality and accrual-based earnings quality are close substitutes, 
although it is likely that the two constructs are positively related.6  In this study, we undertake a 
focused examination of an important component of a firm’s overall disclosure quality, namely 
accruals-based earnings quality.   
Moreover, accruals-based measures of earnings quality can be constructed for a broad 
cross-section of firms and can easily be updated for more recent sample periods.  In contrast, 
AIMR scores are available for a very small and select subset of firms (generally large firms with 
                                                 
5 Note, though that firms that voluntarily adopted either the IAS or the U.S GAAP also simultaneously cross-list on 
foreign exchanges. Lang et al. (2003) show that analyst following increases when foreign firms cross-list on the 
NYSE. Therefore, cross-listing can lead to informational effects that are unrelated to improved disclosure.  
6 See for example, Verrecchia (1990), Tasker (1998), Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008).   
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significant analyst following), and these scores are not available after 1996.  For these reasons, 
we believe that prior research on the relation between overall disclosure quality and information 
asymmetry does not preempt an inquiry on the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry. 
 
Literature on various earnings attributes and information asymmetry  
Our study contributes to a small but growing literature on the linkage between various earnings 
attributes and the liquidity cost in financial markets. Affleck-Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti 
(2002) document that firms with less predictable earnings, measured as the higher dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts, have higher bid-ask spreads. However, forecast dispersion is not an attribute 
of accounting information but rather an outcome of financial reporting quality.  
In a recent study, Jayaraman (2008) documents an association between accruals volatility 
and bid-ask spreads and PIN. Our study differs from Jayaram (2008) in important ways. We 
examine a number of issues related to the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry that Jayaraman (2008) does not. Specifically, we examine the impact of two key 
determinants of earnings quality - innate factors and discretionary factors - and document that the 
impact of the two factors on information asymmetry is different. These results should be of 
interest to corporate managers who have greater control over the latter but not the former, at least 
in the short run. We also document cross-sectional differences in the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry based on the firm’s information environment, which 
provides empirical support for recent theoretical work. Furthermore, we show that poor earnings 
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quality is associated not only with information asymmetry during non earnings-release days, but 
also contributes to the increase in adverse selection risk around the time of earnings releases.7   
 
Testable hypothesis 
Evidence in Sloan (1996) suggests that earnings of firms with large accruals are mean reverting 
but that the marginal investor fails to fully incorporate this information into prices resulting in 
these firms being over-priced.  Recent research also suggests that sophisticated investors (e.g., 
short sellers) can discern that the reported earnings of firms with high accruals are not 
sustainable and assume short positions to arbitrage the overpricing (Desai, Krishnamurthy and 
Venkataraman 2006 and Hirshleifer, Teoh and Yu 2010).  An implication of the above evidence 
is that informed traders are sensitive to the quality of reported earnings, which is consistent with 
the models in Diamond (1985) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). If investors differ in their 
ability to process earnings related information, poor earnings quality can contribute to the 
information asymmetry among market participants. We formalize our expectation in the form of 
the following hypothesis:    
HYPOTHESIS 1. Poor earnings quality is associated with higher information 
asymmetry.  
 
3. Empirical Proxies and Research Design  
Measures of information asymmetry 
We measure information asymmetry as reflected in the adverse selection component of the 
                                                 
7 In a recent study, Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson and Schipper (2011, BEOS) use an econometric technique called 
Path Analysis to investigate the relative strengths of the various linkages between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity. However, Path Analysis does not, in and of itself, determine causality. Rather, researchers have to rely on 
extant theoretical and empirical research to establish, ex ante, the various causal links among variables of interest. 
BEOS (2011) rely on the evidence in our study to posit a link between earnings quality and cost of equity that is 
mediated by information asymmetry.   
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trading cost (see Stoll 2000, for a review of this literature).  The adverse selection component of 
trading cost compensates the market maker for the risk of losing money to informed traders. The 
intuition for the measure is as follows. The market maker expects informed traders to submit buy 
market orders before periods of good news and sell market orders before periods of bad news. 
Assuming that uninformed (liquidity) traders are equally likely to submit buy and sell orders, the 
order flow imbalance of liquidity demanders will tend to be positive (buy exceeds sells) when 
the security is undervalued and negative (sells exceed buys) when the security is overvalued. The 
market maker incorporates the information observed from order flow by adjusting quotes upward 
(downward) when the imbalance is positive (negative).  The magnitude of the quote adjustments 
reflects the market maker’s interpretation of the order imbalance signal. It reflects both the 
market maker’s assessment of the proportion of informed traders vs. liquidity traders and the 
extent of superior information about security value held by the informed traders.   
To capture the adverse selection risk perceived by the market makers, we estimate the 
percentage price impact, proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996):  
Percentage price impact =  2  Dit × (Vi,t + 30  − Midit)  /  Midit × 100         (1), 
where: 
Vi,t + 30      = Measure of the economic value of the asset after the trade proxied by the mid-
point of the first quote reported at least 30 minutes after the transaction. 
Midit        = The mid-point of the quoted ask and bid prices immediately prior to the 
transaction at time t. 
Dit           = A binary variable that equals “1” for market buy-orders and “−1” for market sell-
orders.8  
                                                 
8 Extant research also considers various time horizons (from 5 minutes up to 30 minutes) to estimate an asset’s post-
trade economic value. Werner (2004) reports that spread measures obtained in large samples are relatively 
insensitive to the choice of the post-trade benchmark. For trades in the last half-hour of trading, we use the 4 p.m. 
quotation mid-point, following Bessembinder (2003a). To control for the effect of intervening trades, we construct 
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The percentage price impact measure is a direct measure of information asymmetry as it 
captures the magnitude of market makers’ quote revisions following market orders.9  Note that 
Dit serves to convert price movements associated with market sell-orders (where, on average, we 
expect Vi,t+30 to be below Midit) into a positive number, while the multiplication by 2 accounts for 
information-related trading cost for a round trip trade.   
 As an alternative measure, we estimate the percentage effective spread, a widely used 
measure of trading costs. The effective spread captures both the non-informational (inventory 
costs, order processing costs and possibly market maker rents) and informational (adverse 
selection) costs of liquidity provision and is estimated as follows: 
Percentage effective spread  = 2 × Dit × (Priceit −  Midit) / Midit  × 100          (2), 
where Priceit is the price at which the transaction takes place at time t for security i. In estimating 
the measures, we follow the approach recommended by Bessembinder (2003a) for recent data 
from NYSE and NASDAQ, which modifies the approach proposed by Lee and Ready (1991). 
 
Measures of earnings quality 
Our primary measure of earnings quality is the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002, DD 
hereafter) model used in FLOS (2005). The DD measure is based on the extent to which working 
capital accruals map into realized cash flows from operations. The model relies on the intuition 
that accruals involve estimates of cash flow and that estimates are likely to contain measurement 
errors, either intentional or otherwise. As per DD, higher the magnitude of the estimation error, 
the lower the quality of reported earnings, ceteris paribus. The specification in FLOS (2005), 
based on modifications to the DD model suggested by McNichols (2002), is as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                             
an alternative price impact measure following Venkataraman (2001) that weighs each trade by the inverse of the 
number of transactions in 30 minutes. The conclusions based on the alternative measure are unchanged. 
9 The price impact of trade has been used extensively in empirical market microstructure literature to quantify 
information asymmetry (see for example, Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997; Stoll, 2000; Venkataraman, 2001, 
among others).  Also, as mentioned earlier in footnote 5, this measure is used by the SEC to assess execution quality 
of trades at each U.S. stock “market center” under SEC Rule 605. 
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TCAj,t  =  ß0j + ß1 *CFOj,t−1 + ß2 *CFOj,t + ß3*CFOj,t+1 + ß4*∆REVj,t + ß5*PPEj,t +  υj,t     (3), 
where: 
 TCAj,t     = Total current accruals for firm j in year t.  
CFO         = Cash flow from operations (Compustat annual item 308).  
∆REVj,t    = Change in net sales from t-1 to t (Compustat annual item 12). 
PPEj,t       = Gross Property, plant and equipment in year t (Compustat annual item 7).  
TCA is computed as (∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT) where ∆CA is the change in current 
assets (Compustat annual item 4), ∆CL is the change in current liabilities (Compustat annual 
item 5), ∆Cash is the change in cash (Compustat annual item 162), and ∆STDEBT is the change 
in debt in current liabilities (Compustat annual item 34).  
Equation (3) is estimated separately for each industry group based on the 2-digit SIC 
code in a given year. The industry-specific cross-sectional regressions in a given year generate 
firm-specific residuals for that year. The standard deviation of firm j’s residuals, υj,t, calculated 
over years t − 5 through t − 1, serves as our primary measure of earnings quality (hereafter, the 
FLOS EQ measure).  In this formulation, the higher FLOS EQ measure (higher standard 
deviation) denotes lower earnings quality.       
We recognize that the FLOS EQ measure has some limitations. In particular, it contains 
measurement errors due to omission of firm characteristics, imposes a survivorship bias and the 
estimation assumes that the firm level parameters remain constant over time (see Dechow, Ge 
and Schrand (2010)). We, therefore, replicate our primary analysis using two additional 
measures – the coefficient on the accruals quality factor-mimicking portfolio (e-loading) 
developed in Ecker, Francis, Kim and Schipper (2006) and the magnitude of industry-adjusted 
operating accruals scaled by total assets (OPACCIND).  Ecker et al. (2006) show that e-loading 
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is positively and significantly correlated with other proxies of earnings quality.10  The motivation 
for using operating accruals as a proxy for earnings quality is from Sloan (1996), who shows that 
earnings of firms with extreme values of accruals are not sustainable. We calculate the operating 
accruals (OPACC) for a firm as: 
OPACC = (Earnings − CFO) / ( AverageAssets)           (4), 
where: 
Earnings          =  Income before extraordinary items (Compustat annual data item 18). 
CFO                 = Cash flow from operations from the statement of cash flows.  
AverageAssets  = Mean of beginning and ending total assets (Compustat annual data item 6).   
To control for the systematic differences in the magnitude of accruals across industries, we 
calculate industry-adjusted operating accruals for each firm (OPACCIND), defined as the 
difference between the firm-specific OPACC and the median OPACC for firms in the same 2-
digit SIC code.  Since firms with extreme positive and negative OPACCIND values (i.e., 
extreme departures from industry medians) are considered to have poor earnings quality, we use 
the absolute value of OPACCIND in our analysis.11 
 
Research design 
We examine the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry during non-
earnings announcement periods. As an additional test, we examine whether earnings quality is 
associated with the increase in adverse selection risk around earnings releases. In the latter 
                                                 
10 e-loading is the coefficient on the Accrual Quality (AQ) mimicking factor portfolio in a four-factor Fama and 
French (1993) regression that also includes the market factor (RM-RF), the size factor (SMB) and the book-to-
market factor (HML). The e-loading can thus be interpreted as the exposure to a firm’s earnings quality. This 
procedure is described in detail in Ecker et al. (2006) and we thank Frank Ecker for providing the factor values.  
11 Apart from the above proxies of earnings quality, we have replicated our analyses using the DD (2002) measure 
and reach similar conclusions. These results are not tabulated but available from the authors on request.    
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analysis, the firm acts as its own control and therefore mitigates the concern that any omitted 
firm-specific determinants of earnings quality could be driving the association between earnings 
quality and information asymmetry. Figure 1 illustrates our research design. The earnings 
announcement period is a 3-day window (days –1 through +1) centered on the first-quarter (Q1) 
earnings announcement date of year t+1. The non-announcement period is a two-week window 
(10 trading days) ending exactly two weeks prior to the Q1 earnings announcement of year t+1. 
This design ensures that, for the vast majority of sample observations, the information contained 
in annual reports and 10-K filings for the year t is publicly available to market participants when 
information asymmetry is estimated prior to or around year t + 1 first-quarter (Q1) earnings 
announcements.  Specifically, the earnings quality measures are estimated using fiscal year-end 
data of year t, while we investigate information asymmetry before and surrounding the firm’s Q1 
earnings announcement of year t + 1. For example, information asymmetry surrounding Q1 
earnings announcement of 1998 is paired with FLOS EQ measure as of 1997, which in turn is 
computed using Compustat financial statement data over 1991 through 1997.12  Our conclusions 
are unchanged when information asymmetry is examined before and surrounding the firm’s Q2 
earnings announcement of year t + 1. 
  
4.  Data and Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of all NYSE and NASDAQ firms with available data on the CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT and Trades and Quotes (TAQ) databases. The earnings quality measures are 
based on firm-year observations obtained from Compustat annual tapes for the years 1997 
                                                 
12 As described earlier, FLOS EQ measure in year t is based on the standard deviation of the firm’s residuals from 
annual industry-level regressions over the years t-5 through t-1. Thus, FLOS EQ as of 1997 is based on the standard 
deviation of firm-specific residuals from five annual industry-level regressions over the years 1992 to 1996. Note 
that since the industry-level regression (equation 3) for year t requires CFO for years t-1, t and t+1, financial 
statement data from1991 to 1997 are required to estimate the five annual regressions for the years 1992 to 1996. 
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through 2006. The first quarter (Q1) earnings announcement dates are obtained from Compustat 
quarterly tapes for the years 1998 through 2007.13  Firms on both NYSE and NASDAQ 
experienced a significant decline in tick size due to decimalization in 2001 (see Bessembinder 
2003b). We eliminate the year 2001 to avoid problems arising from comparing non-
announcement and announcement periods in different tick size regimes. We use several filters to 
eliminate trades and quotes obtained from the TAQ database that are non-standard or are likely 
to contain errors.14  Further, in order to avoid drawing inferences using estimates based on a 
small number of transactions in thinly traded issues, we eliminate firm-years with less than 50 
trades during the two-week non-announcement period, or less than 20 trades during the three-day 
announcement period.    
The sample firms also meet the following selection criteria: (a) the stock is not listed as 
an American Depository Receipt (ADR), close-end investment fund, or Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT); (b) the firm has total assets that equal or exceed $1 million; (c) the firm does not 
belong to financial or utilities industry; (d) the firm belongs to a two-digit SIC code with at least 
20 observations; (e) the stock has a market price greater than $5;15 (f) the firm has all the 
necessary Compustat data for calculating earnings quality measures.  The final sample for the 
primary analyses contains 14,389 firm-years.  
 
                                                 
13 Sample coverage described above is based on Compustat’s fiscal-year convention which is often different from 
the actual calendar year of a company’s accounting period-end.   
14 Trades are omitted if they are out of time-sequence, are coded as an error or cancellation, involve a non-standard 
settlement, are exchange acquisitions or distributions, have negative trade prices or involve a price change (since the 
prior trade) greater than 10% in absolute value.  Quotes are deleted if the bid or ask is non-positive, the bid-ask 
spread is negative, the change in the bid or ask price is greater than 10% in absolute value, the bid or ask depth is 
non positive, or the quotes are disseminated during trading halt or during a delayed opening. 
15 The conclusions are unchanged when we screen stocks based on price being greater than $10 or less than $500. 
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5.  Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms.  Panels A and B report descriptive 
statistics for select financial statement variables and the earnings quality measure, FLOS EQ.  
Panel A shows that, although the average assets and net revenues are large, there is significant 
skewness in their distributions, likely due to the inclusion of relatively small NASDAQ firms in 
the sample.16  Mean and median operating accruals are negative, consistent with prior research.  
Panel B shows that the mean (median) value of the earnings quality measure, FLOS EQ, is 15.1 
percent (7.7 percent).  The mean of FLOS EQ is higher than the corresponding number reported 
in FLOS (2005), which can be partly attributed to the observed trend of increased volatility of 
earnings beginning in the late 1980s (e.g., Givoly and Hayn 2000). Panel C reports descriptive 
statistics on firm characteristics, including trading activity.  As expected, market capitalization 
and trading volume are highly skewed as the mean is much larger than the median.  
 Panels D and E report descriptive statistics on trading cost metrics – effective spreads 
and price impact of trade – on earnings announcement (TCANN) and non-announcement days 
(TCNONANN). Prior research finds that information asymmetry increases and liquidity deteriorates 
around earnings announcement (Lee et al. 1993).  Consistent with earlier research, we find that 
both the effective spread and the price impact of trade increase around earnings announcements 
(significant at the 1 percent level).  However, the percentage increase in price impact (Panel E) 
surrounding earnings announcement is appreciably larger than the percentage increase in 
effective spread (Panel D). This is because the effective spread can change over time for reasons 
unrelated to information risk whereas the price impact of trade is a direct measure of the adverse 
                                                 
16 To mitigate the effects of outliers and data errors, all variables are winzorized at the 1% and 99% level. The 
conclusions are unchanged if variables are winzorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% level, or no winzorization is 
implemented.  
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selection risk faced by liquidity providers as reflected in trading costs. For this reason, all the 
tabulated results in the study are based on the price impact of trade as the proxy for information 
asymmetry.   
 
Univariate analysis of information asymmetry by earnings quality groups  
We begin the empirical investigation with an univariate analysis of the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry. The sample firms are placed in quintiles based on 
the magnitude of FLOS EQ each year. We define five indicator variables, G1 through G5 based 
on the quintile ranking of FLOS EQ. Specifically, the indicator variable G1 equals one for firms 
in Quintile 1 (the group with smallest FLOS EQ) and equals zero otherwise, while G5 equals one 
for firms in Quintile 5 and equals zero otherwise.  Since higher values of FLOS EQ denote lower 
quality, Hypothesis 1 predicts a steady increase in the price impact of trade from Quintile 1 to 
Quintile 5.    
Panel A of Table 2 reports coefficients from a regression of price impact on the five 
FLOS EQ indicator variables and a decimal indicator variable that equals one during the period 
after decimalization and equals zero otherwise.17 Consistent with Bessembinder (2003b) we find 
that decimalization has reduced the price impact of trade. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we 
observe a monotonic increase in the price impact of trade from Quintile 1 to Quintile 5. For 
example, the price impact of trade increases from 0.47 percent in Quintile 1 to 0.65 percent in 
Quintile 5.  We find that the difference in price impact for firms in all the higher Quintiles as 
compared to the firms in Quintile 1 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
                                                 
17 We estimate all our regression models, reported in various tables, using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) approach that corrects for heteroskedasticity and also autocorrelation in regression errors, using the Newey-
West covariance estimation technique.  Further, the study’s main inferences remain unchanged when we estimate the 
model using weighted least squares to control for heteroscedasticity and include indicator variable for each year to 
control for time period fixed effects.   
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Panel B reports a similar analysis based on the increase in price impact around earnings 
announcement. We find that the increase in price impact around earnings releases is more 
pronounced for firms in higher EQ Quintiles as compared to the increase in price impact for 
firms in Quintile 1. Collectively, the results in Table 2 suggest that both, the level of information 
asymmetry on non-earnings announcement days as well as the increase in information 
asymmetry on earnings release dates are inversely associated with earnings quality.  
  
Regression analysis of earnings quality on information asymmetry  
In this section, we examine the relation between earnings quality and information asymmetry 
after controlling for firm characteristics known to be systematically associated with information 
asymmetry.  Specifically, we control for the effects of market capitalization, share price, trading 
volume, stock return volatility, institutional ownership, and analyst following (see Stoll 2000 for 
a detailed discussion). Firm size, trading volume, institutional ownership and analyst following 
are associated with the quality and the quantity of information production in financial markets. 
Stock price serves as a proxy for the higher risk associated with low priced securities and the 
discreteness in the pricing grid. Return volatility captures the possibility that informed traders are 
more active in securities with higher uncertainty.18  Prior research finds that NYSE’s floor-based 
market structure is better at resolving information asymmetry than NASDAQ’s dealer / ECN 
structure (e.g., Heidle and Huang 2002). We include a NYSE indicator variable that equals one 
for an NYSE firm and equals zero otherwise. We also include an indicator variable to capture the 
effects of decimalization.   
Although return volatility is associated with trading costs, we exercise caution in 
                                                 
18 In results not reported in tables, we also include average trade size and a measure of (signed) imbalance between 
number of buyer- and the number of seller-initiated transactions as control variables and find similar results. 
19 
 
controlling for its effects in our investigation.  This is because Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(2011) show that poor earnings quality is associated with return volatility.  Moreover, other 
studies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) consider return volatility to be a proxy for information 
asymmetry.  For these reasons, we include “orthogonalized volatility” as a control variable in the 
regressions.  Specifically, we regress return volatility on the FLOS EQ measure and the residual 
from this regression provides the component of return volatility that is independent of the effect 
of earnings quality.19  For the same reason, we use orthogonalized trading volume in regressions.  
Although our hypothesis predicts an inverse association between information asymmetry 
and earnings quality, the functional form of the mapping is not specified by theory.  We 
therefore, implement both a linear and a non-linear specification.20  The linear specification 
includes the magnitude of FLOS EQ, while the non-linear specification includes the FLOS EQ 
Quintile indicator variables (i.e., Q2 to Q5) described earlier.   
Table 3 reports the results of the regression of price impact on earnings quality and other 
economic determinants of information asymmetry.  The predicted sign for each coefficient is 
indicated adjacent to the variable name. Consistent with prior research, we find that information 
asymmetry is significantly lower for firms with higher trading volume, larger market 
capitalization, higher stock price, higher institutional ownership, greater analyst following and 
lower return volatility. Information asymmetry is lower for NYSE-listed firms and it declines 
during the time period after decimalization.   
                                                 
19 The spearman correlation between FLOS EQ and return volatility is 0.32 (significant at the 1% level). Our 
conclusions are unchanged when unorthogonalized return volatility is included as an explanatory variable.   
20 One possibility is that extremely poor quality earnings might prevent even informed investors from generating 
precise signals, which could result in lower informed trading in these firms and hence lower information asymmetry, 
ceteris paribus. If this is the dominant effect, then we should find a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship 
between FLOS EQ and information asymmetry. 
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Turning to earnings quality, we find that the coefficient on FLOS EQ in the linear 
specification (reported in column 2) is 0.13 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
suggesting that earnings quality is significantly and incrementally associated with information 
asymmetry. The inference from the non-linear specification (reported in column 3) is similar. In 
this specification, the model intercept captures the price impact estimated for the benchmark 
portfolio with the highest earnings quality (Quintile1). Relative to Quintile 1, the positive 
coefficients on each of the quintile indicator variables (i.e., G2 to G5) suggests that lower 
earnings quality is associated with higher information asymmetry. It is noteworthy that the 
coefficients exhibit a monotonic increase in magnitude from Quintile 2 to Quintile 5.21  
Theoretical models predict that large firms have incentives to provide better disclosures 
because they enjoy greater benefits from improving disclosures (Diamond 1985). This implies 
that the information advantage of informed traders will be greater in firms operating in relatively 
poor information environment. In a recent paper, Lambert and Verrecchia (2011) predict that the 
adverse consequences of information asymmetry depend on the degree of investor competition in 
the stock. Larger firms and firms with high institutional ownership are associated with more 
information production and higher investor participation. Thus, these firm characteristics also 
serve as reasonable proxies for the degree of investor competition in a stock.22  We test these 
predictions by interacting the FLOS EQ with a dummy variable (High Information Environment) 
                                                 
21 We perform a number of additional tests. We reject the null hypothesis that all of the Quintile coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero (i.e., joint test of G2=G3=G4=G5=0) at the 1% level. We also reject the null of a joint test that 
all the coefficients are equal (i.e., joint test of G1=G2=G3=G4=G5) at the 1% level. Finally, we reject the null 
hypothesis in two of the four cases that the adjacent EQ coefficients are equal, as follows: G1=G2 (p-value=0.00), 
G2=G3 (p-value=0.44), G3=G4 (p-value=0.95) and G4=G5 (p-value=0.04). 
22 Two recent studies, Akins et al. (2011) and Armstrong et al. (2011) examine the impact of investor competition on 
pricing of information asymmetry.  Their results show that the impact of information asymmetry on cost of capital is 
inversely related to the degree of investor competition in a stock.   
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that equals one for firms above the median value of firm size and institutional ownership, 
respectively and zero otherwise.23  
The results in column 4 show that the coefficient on EQ is positive (0.16) and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level suggesting that poor earnings quality is associated with higher 
information asymmetry for the sub-sample of small firms.  Results also suggest that poor 
earnings quality is associated with higher information asymmetry for the sub-sample of large 
firms. The coefficient on the interaction term between EQ and Size is negative (−0.09) implying 
that the earnings quality coefficient estimate for large firms is 0.07 (0.16 + (−0.09)), which is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Our evidence that earnings quality affects 
information asymmetry even for firms operating in richer information environment (large firms) 
is important as prior research (Botosan 1997) does not find an association between disclosure 
quality and cost of capital for firms with rich information environment (firms with high analyst 
following).   
We also find that the magnitude of the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry differs between small and large firms. The negative and significant 
coefficient (−0.09) on the interaction term suggests that the association between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry is less pronounced for larger firms. Specifically, the magnitude of 
the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry is more than twice as large 
for small firms (0.16) compared to large firms (0.07). The inference from column 5 which 
reports the results of the non-linear specification is similar and shows that for each of the EQ 
quintiles, the relation between EQ and information asymmetry is less pronounced for large firms. 
                                                 
23 In the interest of brevity, we report the results for size and institutional ownership but find that the conclusions are 
similar when analyst following serves as proxy for the firm’s information environment.  Our results are also similar 
when we use the information environment dummy to proxy for the main effect of information environment instead 
of the continuous variable.  
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In columns 6 and 7, we use Institutional Ownership to proxy for the information environment 
and find similar results.   
Overall, the results show that the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry is related to a firm’s information environment and that poor earnings quality is 
especially costly for smaller firms and those with low institutional ownership.  These findings 
support the prediction in Lambert and Verrecchia (2011) adverse consequences of information 
asymmetry depend on the degree of investor competition in a stock.      
 
Economic significance of the impact of earnings quality on information asymmetry 
We briefly comment on the economic significance of our results reported thus far. The non-
linear specification in column 3 of Table 3 reports that the adverse selection component of 
trading cost for firms in EQ Quintile 5 exceed those for firms in EQ Quintile 1 by more than 6 
basis points. Alternatively, based on the linear specification (FLOS EQ coefficient of 0.13 in 
column 2 of Table 3), the change from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the FLOS EQ 
distribution yields estimates of similar economic magnitude, approximately 6.5 basis points.  
 The survey article by Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2005) provides some perspective on 
interpreting these economic magnitudes. They note that while the cost of any individual 
transaction can seem small, the overall economic effect of trading cost on the cost of capital for 
corporations and the portfolio allocations for investors is non-trivial, due to huge volume of 
transactions. As an example, they report that a trading cost of only five cents for a $25 stock 
(approximate trading costs of 20 basis points) in 2002 implies a corresponding flow of 18 billion 
dollars for NYSE-listed firms alone. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) estimate that the 
difference in expected returns for a stock with 1 percent spread compared to a same-risk category 
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stock with 0.5 percent spread (i.e., difference in spread of 50 basis points) amounts to about 1.8 
percent on an annualized basis.  Extrapolating these findings to our setting, the impact of poor 
earnings quality alone, controlling for other economic determinants of trading costs, on the 
adverse selection component of liquidity cost appears to be economically non-trivial. 
 
Decomposition of the FLOS EQ measure into innate and discretionary components 
The evidence reported thus far shows that poor accruals (earnings) quality is associated with 
higher adverse selection risk.  This raises the obvious question -- why do corporate managers not 
improve earnings quality? To understand this issue, it is important to recognize that the extent to 
which a firm’s accruals map into cash flows is affected, not only by the discretionary reporting 
choices made by the managers (discretionary factors), but also by the firm’s operating 
environment and its business model (innate factors). This distinction is important because 
managers have little control over the innate factors, at least in the short run. To assess the relative 
contribution of each of the above factors to information asymmetry, we decompose earnings 
(accruals) quality into an innate component and a discretionary component, following the 
approach outlined in FLOS (2005).  
Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
FLOS EQj,t  =  λ0 + λ1* Sizej,t + λ2* σ(CFO)j,t + λ3* σ(Sales)j,t + λ4* OperCyclej,t  
                         + λ5* NegEarnj,t +  εj,t        (5), 
 
where: 
 Sizej,t             = The book value of total assets of firm j in year t.  
σ(CFO)j,t        = The standard deviation of firm j’s cash flow from operations, computed 
over the past 10 years. 
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σ(Sales)j,t        = The standard deviation of firm j’s revenues, computed over the past 10 
years. 
OperCyclej,t    = The log of firm j’s operating cycle.   
NegEarnj,t         = The number of years during the past 10 years that firm j had net income 
before extraordinary items that were less than zero.24   
Both the standard deviation measures are scaled by total assets. In equation (5), the explanatory 
variables account for innate factors that influence accruals quality; consequently, the predicted 
values from annual estimation of equation (5) capture the innate component of FLOS EQ, while 
the unexplained portions (the residuals) capture the discretionary component.25  
It is important to recognize that discretionary accruals reflect a combination of three 
distinct effects (Guay, Kothari, and Watts 1996) – earnings management, managerial efforts to 
convey information about firm performance, and pure noise.  Since we are analyzing a broad 
cross-section of firms, we expect discretionary accruals to reflect elements of earnings 
management as well as attempts by managers to convey information. It is, however, difficult to 
disentangle managerial efforts to manage earnings from managerial efforts to convey 
information except in some specific settings where managers have a strong ex ante incentive to 
manage the reported earnings. The purpose of this study is to examine the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry for a broad cross-section of firms, and 
consequently, this paper does not explore the motivation behind managers’ discretionary 
reporting choices.  
                                                 
24 Operating cycle equals (360*Avg. Accounts Receivable/Sales) + (360*Avg. Inventory/Cost of Goods Sold). 
25 The adjusted R2 from estimating Equation (5) is 28.12%. The coefficient (t-statistic) on Size is -0.03 (-15.59), 
standard deviation of CFO is 0.68 (38.32), standard deviation of Sales is 0.10 (14.16), OperCycle is 0.02 (13.49) and 
NegEarn is 0.013 (18.45).   
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Table 4 reports the results of the regression of price impact on the innate and the 
discretionary components of FLOS EQ. The innate factor coefficient in the linear specification 
(column 1) is 0.26 (significant at the 1 percent level).  In the non-linear specification (column 2), 
the coefficient on the innate factor Quintile indicator variable increases monotonically from 
Quintile 2 to Quintile 5. This evidence suggests that informed investors have a greater advantage 
in firms that operate in volatile and uncertain environments.  
Turning to the discretionary factor, we find that in the linear specification (column 3), the 
coefficient is positive (0.07) and significant at the 1 percent level.  However, this evidence 
should be interpreted with caution because the non-linear specification reported in column 4 
suggests that the functional form of the association between discretionary accruals and 
information asymmetry is U-shaped.  Note that the Quintile 5 coefficient is positive but not 
significant suggesting that the price impact for firms in Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 are similar.  
Further, the coefficients for Quintiles 2 through Quintile 4 are negative suggesting that firms in 
Quintile 2 to Quintile 4 have lower information asymmetry relative to firms in Quintile 1. 
Additions tests reject the null (at the 1 percent level) that the Quintile 5 coefficient is equal to the 
Quintiles 2, 3 and 4 coefficients. Thus, it appears that information asymmetry is high both for 
firms in Quintile 1 and firms in Quintile 5.    
In column 5, we build on this investigation and separately examine the impact of positive 
and negative discretionary accruals on information asymmetry. The coefficient on negative 
discretionary accruals is negative (−0.13) suggesting that as discretionary accruals become more 
negative, we observe an increase in information asymmetry. In contrast, the coefficient on 
positive discretionary accruals is positive (0.22) suggesting that higher values of positive 
discretionary accruals are associated with higher information asymmetry.     
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Since the earnings quality measure is based on the FLOS model and is estimated using 
industry-level regressions, the interpretation is that high FLOS EQ is associated with poor 
earnings quality.  Therefore, we expect negative discretionary accruals to improve earnings 
quality because they improve the mapping of accruals to cash flows (i.e., reduce volatility in this 
association) relative to other firms in the same industry. In the same vein, positive discretionary 
accruals increase the volatility in the mapping and as a result reduce earnings quality. Although, 
the ex ante expectation is an inverse and linear relationship between discretionary accruals and 
information asymmetry, our results suggest a U-shaped association between the two constructs 
wherein both large positive discretionary accruals (Quintile 5) and large negative discretionary 
accruals (Quintile 1) are associated with higher information asymmetry.  One interpretation of 
this evidence is that discretionary reporting choices that introduce a substantial deviation in the 
mapping of accruals to cash flows relative to other firms in the industry can befuddle investors 
and increase information asymmetry, ceteris paribus. 
The analyses reported thus far suggest that earnings quality has a strong association with 
the level of adverse selection risk as reflected in trading costs. The impact of earnings quality is 
more pronounced for firms with relatively poor information environment. Both innate and 
discretionary components of earnings quality have a significant impact on information 
asymmetry; however the relationship is not similar. In particular, both extreme positive and 
extreme negative discretionary accruals are associated with higher information asymmetry.   
 
Alternative measures of earnings quality 
In this section, we investigate whether the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry is robust to alternative measures of earnings quality. The robustness analysis is 
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important because there is no universally accepted “best” measure of earnings quality and it is, 
therefore, important to assess the main tenor of results using reasonable surrogates of earnings 
quality. The first measure is the loading on accruals quality factor-mimicking portfolio (e-
loading) developed in Ecker et al. (2006). The second measure is the absolute value of the 
magnitude of industry-adjusted operating accruals scaled by total assets (OPACCIND).26   
  Table 5 reports the results based on the two alternative measures of earnings quality.  The 
coefficient on e-loading measure in column (1) is positive (0.14) and significant, confirming that 
poor earnings quality is associated with higher information asymmetry. The inference from the 
non-linear specification reported in column (2) is similar.  We observe a monotonic increase in 
information asymmetry from the lower quintiles to the higher quintile of e-loading.  The results 
in columns 3 and 4 show that although the adverse effect of poor earnings quality on information 
asymmetry is higher for smaller firms, the coefficients on the interaction terms are not 
significant.   
The next four columns (columns 5 through 8) report on the association between the 
industry-adjusted operating accruals and information asymmetry.  Since extreme positive and 
extreme negative values of industry-adjusted accruals represent poor earnings quality, we define 
OPACCIND as the absolute value of industry-adjusted accruals.  Thus, as OPACCIND 
increases, earnings quality declines.  The results of the linear specification reported in column 5 
show that the coefficient on OPACCIND is positive (0.52) and significant thereby confirming 
the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry documented in Table 3.  
The non-linear specification based on OPACCIND (column 6) shows that the coefficients on 
Quintile 4 and Quintile 5 are significantly positive suggesting that firms with poor earnings 
                                                 
26 The Pearson correlation between FLOS-EQ and e-loading is 0.30 and between FLOS-EQ and the absolute value 
of industry-adjusted operating accruals is 0.27. 
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quality are associated with higher price impact. The results in column 7 confirm prior findings 
that the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry is more pronounced for 
small firms. Overall, the results using the two alternate measures of earnings quality are 
consistent with earlier results. 
 
Controlling for potential endogeneity inherent in the determination of earnings quality 
Our analysis thus far assumes that earnings quality is exogenous. However, earnings quality 
could be endogenous in the sense that certain firm characteristics that affect earnings quality 
might also affect the consequences of poor earnings quality (Cohen 2008).  For example, firm 
characteristics such as cash flow volatility can affect both earnings quality and information 
asymmetry and would bias regression estimates in the absence of proper controls.  Thus, we 
employ the two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach to correct for such endogeneity 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry.  In the first stage, we model the firm-
specific determinants of earnings quality, closely following the approach outlined in Cohen 
(2008).27  In the second stage, the measures of information asymmetry are regressed on the 
predicted value of earnings quality from the first stage (FLOS EQ IV) and other known 
determinants of trading costs. The FLOS EQ IV acts as an instrument for the component of 
earnings quality that is unrelated to firm characteristics that influence information asymmetry.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports the regression analysis that models the determinants of 
earnings quality.  The coefficient on Growth is positive and significant suggesting that high 
                                                 
27 Specifically, the firm-specific determinants of earnings quality include: Owner (log of number of shareholders), 
Growth (annual growth in sales), Herf  (Herfindahl index for the industry in which the firm operates), Issue 
(indicator variable for debt or equity issuance), Lit (indicator variable denoting if the firm operates in a “high-
litigation” industry), Leverage (debt over average assets),OC (operating cycle of the firm), Size (log of market 
capitalization), and Age (the number of months the firm has been listed on CRSP).  Cohen (2008) discusses how 
each of these firm characteristics may affect earnings quality.      
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growth firms have poor earnings quality. The coefficient on Issue is positive but not significant.  
The coefficients on Lit and OC are significantly positive indicating that firms in industries with 
high litigation risk and those with long operating cycles have poor earnings quality. The 
coefficients on Owner and Herf are negative implying that firms with higher ownership 
concentration and those operating in concentrated industries tend to have better earnings quality. 
Finally, as expected, the coefficients on Size and Age are negative suggesting that larger and 
older firms generally have better earnings quality. Overall, the results reported here are 
consistent with extant research and those reported in Cohen (2008).   
Panel B of Table 6 presents regression coefficients from the second stage analysis.  In the 
linear specification reported in column 1, the coefficient on FLOS EQ IV is positive (0.26) and 
highly significant.  In the non-linear specification (column 2), we find that firms in Quintile 4 
and Quintile 5 have significantly higher information asymmetry than firms in Quintile 1.  In 
column 3 and column 4, we note that the interaction term of high information environment with 
FLOS EQ IV is negative suggesting that earnings quality has a more pronounced impact on 
information asymmetry for smaller firms. Overall, the inverse relation between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry reported in Table 3 can be observed after controlling for endogeneity 
using an instrumental variable approach.   
 
Impact of earnings quality on the increase in information asymmetry around earnings 
announcements 
 
We also address the endogeneity concern by investigating the association between earnings 
quality and the change in information asymmetry around earnings announcements. In this 
analysis, the price impact surrounding earnings announcements is compared with the price 
impact surrounding a recent non-earnings announcement period for the same firm. This research 
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design allows the firm to act as its own control, thereby minimizing the possibility that the 
association can be attributed to omitted firm-specific attributes. Nonetheless, we control for firm 
characteristics that may be correlated with the increase in information asymmetry around 
earnings release dates.  Our investigation provides for a better understanding of the well known 
result in the literature that information asymmetry increases around earnings releases (Lee et al.  
1993, among others).28  We investigate whether earnings quality is an important determinant of 
the increase in information asymmetry surrounding earnings releases.   
It is important to note that the advantages of the research design come at the cost of low 
power. This is because the event study approach effectively eliminates the impact of earnings 
quality on the cross-sectional variation in the level of information asymmetry in the non-
announcement (benchmark) period.  A related observation is that since information asymmetry is 
already higher for firms with poor earnings quality, as documented earlier, the increase in 
information asymmetry around earnings releases for these firms is likely to be small.    
Prior research documents that price and volume reactions surrounding earnings 
announcements are larger for firms with relatively poor information environment.29   
Consequently, we include stock price, market capitalization, trading volume, institutional 
ownership and analyst following to capture the cross-sectional variation in information 
production.  To capture the information flow around earnings releases, we include the level of 
(orthogonalized) return volatility and the increase in trading volume surrounding earnings 
releases relative to a non-announcement period for the same firm. We also include a seasonal 
                                                 
28 Using recent data, Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2004) show that information asymmetry, 
manifested as adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, is higher on earnings announcement days relative 
to non-announcement period. Along similar lines, Bhattacharya et al. (2007) document significant abnormal trading 
by sophisticated and less sophisticated investors during the three days surrounding an earnings announcement.  The 
accruals anomaly first identified in Sloan (1996) appears to be concentrated on trading days surrounding earnings 
announcements. 
29 See, for example, Bamber (1987), Bamber, Barron and Stober (1997), Bhattacharya (2001), among others.  
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random-walk earnings surprise variable (scaled by stock price) to control for magnitudes of 
earnings surprises (e.g., Affleck-Graves et al. 2002). 
Table 7 reports the regression coefficients of the change in price impact surrounding 
earnings announcements on earning quality measures and the control variables.  Consistent with 
prior work, the increase in information asymmetry around earnings announcement is higher for 
smaller firms and low priced firms.  Many of the other coefficients are not significant. In 
particular, the coefficient on unexpected earnings is not, possibly due to the presence of several 
variables in the specification that also capture earnings-related information flow.30   
The linear specification reported in column 1 does not show a significant association 
between EQ and the change in price impact but the significant association can be observed in the 
non-linear specification reported in column 2. We find that firms in Quintile 2 through Quintile 5 
have larger increase in information asymmetry around earnings releases as compared to the 
increase in information asymmetry observed for firms in Quintile 1 (significant at the 5 percent 
level). The results using alternative measures of earnings quality are broadly supportive of the 
results using FLOS EQ. The coefficient on e-loading measure in column 3 (linear specification) 
is positive and weakly significant at the 10 percent level. Consistent with results in column 2, the 
non-linear specification using e-loading measure in column 4 finds evidence of an association 
between e-loading and change in information asymmetry. The general tenor of results and hence 
inference using industry-adjusted accruals (OPACCIND) is similar.  
In summary, although the relationship is weak (as conjectured earlier), the inverse 
relation between earnings quality and the increase in information asymmetry around earnings 
releases is observed for all measures of earnings quality.  In untabulated results, we also find that 
                                                 
30 We find that firm size, analyst following, institutional ownership and volatility are highly correlated, which can 
explain the negative coefficient on volatility. In a specification where we drop the correlated variables, we find that 
the increase in price impact surrounding earnings announcement is positively correlated with volatility. 
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the association between earnings quality and the increase in information asymmetry is more 
pronounced for small firms.  We conclude that poor earnings quality is associated with both the 
level of information asymmetry during non-earnings release periods as well as an increase in 
information asymmetry around earnings releases. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
A fundamental role of financial reporting is to serve as a basis for capital allocation. However, 
the quality of reported earnings is influenced by a firm’s fundamentals such as its operating 
environment and business model as well as by the discretionary reporting choices made by the 
managers. To the extent investors differ in their ability to process this information, poor earnings 
quality can lead to differentially informed investors. Higher information asymmetry is costly as it 
increases the adverse selection risk for market participants and lowers liquidity. For these 
reasons, standard setters and regulators are concerned about the quality of accounting 
information and its consequences for capital allocation decisions.  
In this paper, we investigate the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry.  For a broad sample of NYSE and NASDAQ firms over the period 1998-2007, we 
document that poor earnings quality is significantly associated with higher information 
asymmetry as manifested in the adverse selection component of trading cost. The impact of 
earnings quality on information asymmetry is affected by the firm’s information environment 
and is more pronounced for firms operating in relatively impoverished disclosure environment.  
Both innate and discretionary components of earnings quality are significantly associated 
with information asymmetry. However, the association between discretionary accruals and 
information asymmetry is U-shaped suggesting that managerial choices that cause accruals 
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volatility to be too high or too low relative to industry norms increase information asymmetry. 
The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings quality, alternative model 
specifications, and the correction for potential endogeneity between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry. Further, poor earnings quality appears to be a determinant of the 
elevated information asymmetry around earnings releases.  
Overall, our study provides empirical support for the concerns articulated by regulators 
that an important adverse consequence of poor earnings quality is increased information 
asymmetry and reduced liquidity.   
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Figure 1 Time Line of Events 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms 
 
Mean Median
Panel A: Financial statement variables
Average assets (Millions) 2,260 376
Net revenue (Millions) 2,233 387
Gross property, plant and equipment (Millions) 1,413 145
Return on assets (ROA) 0.9% 4.6%
Cash flow from operations over total assets 0.07 0.09
Operating accruals over total assets -0.07 -0.05
Annual earnings per share before extraordinary items 0.59 0.62
Absolute unexpected first-quarter earnings (random-walk) 0.21 0.10
Panel B: Earnings quality 
FLOS EQ measure 15.1% 7.7%
Adjusted R2 values from FLOS industry-specific regressions 38.1% 34.3%
Panel C: Firm characteristics
Stock price 35.8 26.5
Return volatility 2.9 2.2
Market capitalization (Millions) 3,492 467
Daily Trading Volume (Thousands) 5,680 1,520
Average trade size 771 527
Panel D: Percentage effective spread
  Average non-announcement period (TC NONANN) 0.6992 0.3268
  Average announcement period (TC ANN) 0.7150 0.3330
  Percentage increase around earnings announcements 2.26% 1.90%
Panel E: Price impact of trade
  Average non-announcement period (TC NONANN) 0.4085 0.2246
  Average announcement period (TC ANN) 0.4447 0.2339
  Percentage increase around earnings announcements 8.86% 4.14%
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
The table presents the descriptive statistics on our final sample of 14,389 firm-years.  The financial 
statements data reported in Panel A are obtained from Compustat, as follows: book value of assets 
(annual data 6), revenues (annual data 12), property plant and equipment (annual data 7), annual and 
quarterly diluted earnings per share before extraordinary items (annual data 18 and quarterly data 9) and 
cash flow from operations (annual data 308). Absolute first-quarter (Q1) random-walk earnings surprise is 
computed as the absolute value of the first quarter (Q1) EPS for year t minus the Q1 EPS for year t-1.  
Earnings quality in Panel B, FLOS EQ, is the accruals quality measure proposed in Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson and Schipper (2005).  Panel C reports firm characteristics and trading activity.  The mean and 
median stock price, return volatility, market capitalization (millions), average trade size (shares) and 
cumulative number of trades (shares) values are obtained from Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. Market 
capitalization, stock price, trading volume and return volatility are measured over the non-announcement 
period. The non-announcement window is a two-week period (10 trading days) ending exactly two weeks 
prior to earnings announcement date. Panel D reports effective spreads while Panel E reports price impact 
of trade during earnings announcement windows (TCANN) and non-announcement windows (TCNONANN) 
estimated from the TAQ data. Announcement window is defined as days –1 to +1 surrounding earnings 
announcement date. The price impact of trade is computed as [2 × Dit × (Vi, t+30 – Midit) / Midit × 100], 
where Vi, t+30 is the midpoint of the quote observed 30 minutes after the trade, Midit is the quote midpoint 
for firm i at time t, and D is an indicator variable that equals “1” for a market buy and “-1” for a market 
sell. The effective spread is computed as [2 × Dit × (Priceit – Midit) / Midit × 100] where Priceit is the 
transaction takes at time t for security i.  The effective spreads and price impact of trade is estimated using 
the approach outlined in Huang and Stoll (1996).  
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TABLE 2 
Univariate association between information asymmetry and earnings quality 
 
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 Decimal
indicator
Panel A: Price impact of trade, by earnings quality groups
% Price impact 0.4666 0.5492 0.5976 0.6310 0.6453 -0.2604
  Diff. from G1 0.0826*** 0.1310*** 0.1643*** 0.1787***
   p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B: Increase in price impact around earnings announcements, by earnings quality groups
% increase in price impact 0.0145 0.0295 0.0297 0.0467 0.0496
  Diff. from G1 0.0151* 0.0152* 0.0322*** 0.0352***
   p-value (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
 
 
Table 2, Panel A reports the price impact of trade by earnings quality groups. Table 2, Panel B reports the abnormal price impact of trade 
surrounding earnings announcements grouped by earnings quality. Abnormal price impact is announcement period price impact minus non-
announcement period price impact for the same firm in the same quarter.  The announcement window is defined as days –1 to +1 around the 
earnings announcement. The non-announcement window is a two-week period (10 trading days) ending exactly two weeks prior to earnings 
announcement date. The price impact of trade is computed as [2 × Dit × (Vi, t+30 – Midit) / Midit × 100], where Vi, t+30 is the midpoint of the quote 
observed 30 minutes after the trade, Midit is the quote midpoint for firm i at time t, and D is an indicator variable that equals “1” for a market buy 
and “-1” for a market sell. The price impact of trade is estimated using the approach outlined in Huang and Stoll (1996). Earnings quality is the 
measure proposed in FLOS (2005).  Firms are grouped into quintile portfolios every year based on earnings quality. Indicator variable G1 equals 
one for firms in quintile 1 (the group with best earnings quality) and equals zero otherwise, while G5 equals one for firms in Quintile 5 and equals 
0 otherwise. Reported are the regression coefficients of price impact of trade (Panel A) and the change in price impact surrounding earnings 
announcements (Panel B) on earnings quality indicator variables and a decimal indicator variable. The decimal indicator variable equals one for 
the period after decimalization and equals zero otherwise. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Regression of information asymmetry on firm characteristics and earnings quality 
 
(5) (7)
Intercept 0.7336*** 0.6921*** 0.6862*** 0.6881*** 0.6727*** 0.6865*** 0.6648***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Capitalization (-) -0.3360*** -0.3440*** -0.3410*** -0.3400*** -0.3320*** -0.3420*** -0.3310***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Price (-) -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0012***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trading Volume (ortho) (-) -0.1379*** -0.1405*** -0.1396*** -0.1391*** -0.1360*** -0.1403*** -0.1384***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volatility (ortho) (+) 5.6482*** 5.7725*** 5.6608*** 5.7520*** 5.6026*** 5.7699*** 5.6492***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Institutional Holdings (-) -0.0447*** -0.0426*** -0.0437*** -0.0421*** -0.0433*** -0.0413*** -0.0394***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Analyst Following (-) -0.0212*** -0.0203*** -0.0206*** -0.0188*** -0.0176*** -0.0196*** -0.0191***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NYSE Exchange Ind. (-) -0.0934*** -0.0746*** -0.0788*** -0.0744*** -0.0725*** -0.0750*** -0.0765***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Decimal Indicator (-) -0.0906*** -0.0863*** -0.0892*** -0.0871*** -0.0909*** -0.0862*** -0.0886***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Earnings quality 
 EQ (+) 0.1335*** 0.1632*** 0.1487***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 EQ * High Information Envr (-) -0.0910*** ^^^ -0.0425* ^^^
  p-value (0.00) (0.09)
Earnings quality quintiles
G2 0.0291*** 0.0579*** 0.0383**
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
G2 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0461** -0.0147 ^^^
  p-value (0.02) (0.39)
G3 0.0382*** 0.0601*** 0.0662***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G3 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0368** ^^^ -0.0496*** ^^
  p-value (0.03) (0.00)
G4 0.0390*** 0.0580*** 0.0551***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G4 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0322** ^^^ -0.0293* ^^^
  p-value (0.05) (0.07)
G5 0.0633*** 0.0832*** 0.0733***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G5 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0403*** ^^^ -0.0258* ^^^
  p-value (0.01) (0.08)
Adjusted R2 40.77% 41.06% 40.87% 41.09% 40.91% 41.06% 40.90%
Number of Observations 14389 14389 14389 14389 14389 14389 14389
Price Impact of Trades (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Size Institutional Ownership
(6)
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Table 3 presents the regression coefficients of the price impact of trade on firm characteristics and earning 
quality. The price impact of trade, the earnings quality measure and the control variables are defined in 
the previous tables. The control variables are calculated over the non-announcement period, which is a 
two-week period (10 trading days) ending exactly two weeks prior to earnings announcement date. 
Orthogonalized volatility is the component of return volatility that is independent of earnings quality 
effects.  Specifically, we regress return volatility on the EQ measure and use the residuals from the 
regression as orthogonalized volatility. Similarly, orthogonalized volume is the component of trading 
volume that is independent of earnings quality effects. Institutional ownership aggregates the holding by 
institutions reported in the Thomson/Reuters database during the quarter preceding and closest to the 
annual earnings announcement date. Analyst Following is the number of individual analysts providing 
forecasts on IBES in the 90-day pre-announcement window ending one day before each earnings 
announcement date. NYSE exchange is an indicator variable that equals one for an NYSE firm and equals 
zero otherwise. For the non-linear specification, we define five indicator variables G1 through G5, based 
on the quintile ranking of earnings quality. Indicator variable G1 equals one for firms in quintile 1 (the 
group with best earnings quality) and equals zero otherwise, while G5 equals one for firms in Quintile 5 
and equals 0 otherwise. The non-linear specification excludes G1 (the highest earnings quality quintile).  
Expected signs on the coefficients on the explanatory variables are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, for the hypothesis 
that the coefficient is zero. ^^^, ^^, ^ denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent levels, respectively, for the hypothesis that the sum of the earnings quality coefficient and the 
corresponding interaction coefficient with High Information firms is zero. 
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TABLE 4 
 Regression of information asymmetry on components of earnings quality  
 
(2) (5)
Pos Disc Acc
Intercept 0.6684*** 0.6955*** 0.7295*** 0.7416*** 0.7108***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Capitalization (-) -0.3630*** -0.3550*** -0.3310*** -0.3290*** -0.3380***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Price (-) -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trading Volume (ortho) (-) -0.1417*** -0.1404*** -0.1382*** -0.1389*** -0.1390***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volatility (ortho) (+) 5.6084*** 5.6394*** 5.7595*** 5.6803*** 5.7277***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Institutional Holdings (-) -0.0433*** -0.0446*** -0.0450*** -0.0448*** -0.0445***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Analyst Following (-) -0.0164*** -0.0185*** -0.0218*** -0.0205*** -0.0202***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NYSE Exchange Ind. (-) -0.0798*** -0.0846*** -0.0865*** -0.0842*** -0.0865***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Decimal Indicator (-) -0.0895*** -0.0917*** -0.0866*** -0.0887*** -0.087***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Earnings quality 
 EQ (+) 0.2624*** 0.0672***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00)
 EQ *Negative Disc. EQ -0.1306**
  p-value (0.02)
 EQ *Positive Disc. EQ 0.2163***
  p-value (0.00)
Earnings quality quintile groups
G2 0.0112 -0.0344***
  p-value (0.30) (0.00)
G3 0.0285** -0.0295**
  p-value (0.02) (0.01)
G4 0.0550*** -0.0226*
  p-value (0.00) (0.05)
G5 0.0621*** 0.0090
  p-value (0.00) (0.47)
Adjusted R2 40.89% 40.82% 40.88% 40.80% 40.94%
Number of Observations 14221 14221 14221 14221 14221
INNATE component of 
earnings quality
Price Impact of Trades (%)
(1) (3) (4)
DISCRETIONARY component of earnings 
quality
 
     46
 
 
Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Table 4 presents the regression coefficients of price impact of trade on innate and discretionary 
component of earnings quality. The models also include known attributes controlling for cross-sectional 
variations in firm characteristics. The decomposition of the earnings quality into innate and discretionary 
component follows the approach in FLOS (2005, p. 316). The innate component captures the innate, firm-
specific drivers of earnings quality while the discretionary component captures managerial discretions and 
manipulations.  Positive discretionary accrual is an indicator variable that equals one if discretionary 
accrual is positive and equals zero otherwise. The price impact of trade, the earnings quality and the 
control variables are defined in the previous tables. The control variables are calculated over the non-
announcement period, which is a two-week period (10 trading days) ending exactly two weeks prior to 
earnings announcement date. Expected signs on the coefficients on the explanatory variables are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively, for the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. 
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TABLE 5 
 Regression of information asymmetry on alternative measures of earnings quality  
 
(3) (4) (7)
Intercept 0.6710*** 0.6256*** 0.6700*** 0.6255*** 0.6960*** 0.7169*** 0.6930*** 0.7085***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Capitalization (-) -0.3370*** -0.3380*** -0.3370*** -0.3360*** -0.5320*** -0.5160*** -0.5210*** -0.5090***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Price (-) -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trading Volume (ortho) (-) -0.1415*** -0.1397*** -0.1414*** -0.1399*** -0.1333*** -0.1312*** -0.1317*** -0.1293***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volatility (ortho) (+) 5.7109*** 5.6614*** 5.7079*** 5.6741*** 5.7062*** 5.6560*** 5.6862*** 5.6352***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Institutional Holdings (-) -0.0403*** -0.0416*** -0.0401*** -0.0412*** -0.0468*** -0.0479*** -0.0464*** -0.0473***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Analyst Following (-) -0.0163*** -0.0193*** -0.0160*** -0.0190*** -0.0183*** -0.0210*** -0.0166*** -0.0189***
  p-value (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
NYSE Exchange Ind. (-) -0.0576*** -0.0570*** -0.0578*** -0.0589*** -0.0696*** -0.0726*** -0.0674*** -0.0690***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Decimal Indicator (-) -0.0938*** -0.0942*** -0.0939*** -0.0938*** -0.0950*** -0.0981*** -0.0961*** -0.0992***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Earnings quality 
 EQ (+) 0.1448*** 0.1486*** 0.5233*** 0.5919***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 EQ * High Information Envr (-) -0.0119 ^^^ -0.2671*** ^^^
  p-value (0.39) (0.00)
Earnings quality quintile groups
G2 (+) 0.0230** 0.0076 0.0003 0.0047
  p-value (0.02) (0.69) (0.98) (0.81)
G2 * High Information Envr (-) 0.0241 -0.0077
  p-value (0.21) (0.67)
G3 (+) 0.0514*** 0.0414** 0.0054 0.0090
  p-value (0.00) (0.02) (0.61) (0.62)
G3 * High Information Envr (-) 0.0185 ^^ -0.0057
  p-value (0.29) (0.74)
G4 (+) 0.1001*** 0.1037*** 0.0285** 0.0417**
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
G4 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0097 ^^^ -0.0262* ^
  p-value (0.58) (0.09)
G5 (+) 0.1883*** 0.1928*** 0.0914*** 0.1142***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G5 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0222 ^^^ -0.0613***^^^
  p-value (0.19) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 41.53% 41.33% 41.53% 41.33% 40.80% 40.62% 40.83% 40.65%
Number of Observations 14666 14666 14666 14666 14596 14596 14596 14596
E-loading Measure OPACCIND Measure
Firm Size
(5) (6) (8)
Firm Size
(1) (2)
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
This table reports coefficients from the regression of the price impact of trade on two alternative measures 
of earnings quality. The price impact of trade and the control variables have been defined in the previous 
tables. The alternative earnings quality measures are (1) the loading on accruals quality factor-mimicking 
portfolio developed in Ecker et. al. (2006, e-loading), and (2) the absolute value of industry-adjusted 
operating accruals scaled by total assets (OPACCIND). E-loading is the coefficient on the Accrual 
Quality (AQ) mimicking factor portfolio in a four-factor Fama and French (1993) regression that also 
includes the market factor (RM-RF), the size factor (SMB) and the book-to-market factor (HML). The e-
loading can thus be interpreted as the exposure to a firm’s earnings quality. For calculating the 
OPACCIND measure, we first compute operating accruals as earnings minus cash flow from operations, 
scaled by average assets. Next, we control for the systematic difference in accruals across industries by 
taking the difference between the firm-specific operating accruals and the median operating accruals for 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC code.  Firms with extreme positive and negative OPACCIND values (i.e., 
extreme departures from industry medians) are considered to have poor earnings quality. Expected signs 
on the coefficients on the explanatory variables are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level respectively for the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. 
^^^, ^^, ^ denote statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level respectively for the hypothesis 
that the sum of the earnings quality coefficient and the corresponding interaction coefficient with High 
Information firms is zero. 
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TABLE 6 
Regression of the information asymmetry on earnings quality instrumental variable  
 
 
Panel A:  Firm-Specific Determinants of Earnings Quality
Intercept Owner Growth Herf Index Issue Lit Leverage OC Size Age
Parameter
estimate 0.5936*** -0.0024** 0.1022*** -0.1527 0.0041 0.0635*** -0.1032*** 0.0002*** -0.0049** -0.0758**
p-value (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.64) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
 
 
 
This table reports the results of a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach to account for endogeneity of earnings quality and information 
asymmetry. In Panel A, we model the firm-specific determinants of earnings quality following the approach outlined in Cohen (2008). The firm-
specific determinants include: Owner (log of number of shareholders), Growth (annual growth in sales), Herf (Herfindahl index for the industry in 
which the firm operates), Issue (indicator variable for debt or equity issuance), Lit (indicator variable denoting if the firm operates in a “high-
litigation” industry), Leverage (debt over average assets), OC (operating cycle of the firm), Size (log of market capitalization), Age (the number of 
months the firm has been listed on CRSP). Panel B reports the results of the second-stage regression of the price impact of trade on first stage 
instrumental variable (FLOS EQ IV) and control variables. The price impact of trade and the control variables are defined in the previous tables. 
Expected signs on the coefficients on the explanatory variables in Panel B are in parenthesis. The adjusted R2 value from the first-stage model 
estimation is 33.13%. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level respectively for the hypothesis that the coefficient 
is zero^^^, ^^, ^ denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, for the hypothesis that the sum of the 
earnings quality coefficient and the corresponding interaction coefficient with High Information firms is zero. 
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Panel B: % Price impact of trade on Earnings Quality (FLOS) Instrument
(2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.6809*** 0.7006*** 0.6614*** 0.6819***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market Capitalization (-) -0.3473*** -0.3419*** -0.3247*** -0.3278***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Price (-) -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trading Volume (ortho) (-) -0.1374*** -0.1385*** -0.1325*** -0.1352***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Volatility (ortho) (+) 5.5413*** 5.5172*** 5.4708*** 5.4685***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Institutional Holdings (-) -0.0444*** -0.0437*** -0.0428*** -0.0424***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Analyst Following (-) -0.0231*** -0.0232*** -0.0179*** -0.0197***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NYSE Exchange Ind. (-) -0.0737*** -0.0729*** -0.0672*** -0.0696***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Decimal Indicator (-) -0.0839*** -0.0839*** -0.0853*** -0.0852***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Earnings quality 
EQ IV (+) 0.2600*** 0.3903***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00)
EQ IV * High Information Envr (-) -0.3108*** ^^^
  p-value (0.00)
Earnings quality quintile groups
IV2 -0.0089 0.0021
  p-value (0.45) (0.90)
IV2 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0107
  p-value (0.55)
IV3 -0.0150 -0.0176
  p-value (0.21) (0.26)
IV3 * High Information Envr (-) 0.0203
  p-value (0.25)
IV4 0.0333*** 0.0693***
  p-value (0.01) (0.00)
IV4 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0428*** ^
  p-value (0.00)
IV5 0.0778*** 0.1184***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00)
IV5 * High Information Envr (-) -0.0708*** ^^
  p-value (0.00)
Adjusted R2 40.63% 40.80% 40.78% 40.98%
Number of Observations 13842 13842 13842 13842
Firm Size
(1)
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TABLE 7 
Regression of change in information asymmetry surrounding earnings announcements on 
earnings quality measures and firm characteristics 
 
Intercept 0.0602*** 0.0283* 0.0457*** 0.0396** 0.0482*** 0.0203
  p-value (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.22)
Market Capitalization (-) -0.2960** -0.2820** -0.2230* -0.2440** -0.6150*** -0.5830***
  p-value (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Stock Price (-) -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trading Volume (ortho) (-) 0.0022 0.0013 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005
  p-value (0.55) (0.72) (0.80) (0.94) (0.96) (0.89)
Change in Trading Vol. (+) -1.0700** -1.0400** -1.2700*** -1.3800*** -0.8624 -0.8954
  p-value (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.26)
Volatility (ortho) (+) -1.1444*** -1.1568*** -1.1792*** -1.1829*** -1.1062*** -1.0932***
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Institutional Holdings (-) -0.0036 -0.0029 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0018
  p-value (0.27) (0.38) (0.73) (0.64) (0.52) (0.58)
Analyst Following (-) -0.0050 -0.0045 -0.0030 -0.0038 -0.0018 -0.0014
  p-value (0.26) (0.30) (0.49) (0.37) (0.68) (0.75)
Unexpected Earnings  (+) 6.6694 7.2831 4.2634 4.7452 1.3739 1.3682
  p-value (0.36) (0.30) (0.54) (0.49) (0.32) (0.32)
NYSE Exchange Ind. (-) 0.0018 0.0115** 0.0026 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0030
  p-value (0.76) (0.05) (0.64) (0.83) (0.91) (0.59)
Earnings quality 
FLOS (+) 0.0037 0.0144* 0.0317
  p-value (0.81) (0.09) (0.48)
Earnings quality decile groups
G2 (+) 0.0202** 0.0139* 0.0269***
  p-value (0.01) (0.07) (0.00)
G3 (+) 0.0187** 0.0080 0.0308***
  p-value (0.03) (0.34) (0.00)
G4 (+) 0.0439*** 0.0221** 0.0393***
  p-value (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
G5 (+) 0.0372*** 0.0245** 0.0349***
  p-value (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.70% 0.86% 0.84% 0.85% 0.70% 0.85%
Number of Observations 13478 13478 13747 13747 13736 13736
E-Loading
(5) (6)
OPACCIND
(1) (2) (4)(3)
FLOS
 
     52
 
Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Table 7 presents the regression coefficients of abnormal (or increase in) price impact of trade 
surrounding earnings announcements on alternative measures of earning quality.  Abnormal price impact 
is defined as the announcement period price impact less non-announcement period price impact for the 
same firm, where non-announcement period is defined as a two-week period (10 trading days) ending two 
weeks before earnings announcement.  The regression models include firm-specific attributes that explain 
cross-sectional variations in information asymmetry surrounding earnings announcements. The variables 
include market capitalization, share price, trading volume, institutional ownership, analyst following and 
volatility.  Measures of price impact, earnings quality and control variables are defined in the previous 
tables. Additional control variables are change in trading volume and unexpected or seasonal random-
walk change in earnings. The change in trading volume is the increase in trading volume around earnings 
announcement relative to non-announcement period for the same firm. Unexpected earnings is computed 
by taking the absolute value of the first quarter (Q1) EPS for year t minus the Q1 EPS for year t-1, and 
scaling this difference by stock price. The table reports results of a linear specification and a non-linear 
specification based on quintile ranks of earnings quality.  Expected signs on the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
    
 
 
 
 
